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Knick v. Township of Scott: THE SUPREME COURT’S PROPER CONCLUSION
OVERRULING AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT USING
AN INAPPROPRIATE ANALYSIS
Katherine Lingold*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note analyzes the Pennsylvania case of Knick v. Township of
Scott,1 appealed to the United States Supreme Court to determine whether
a property owner’s Fifth Amendment right to compensation from
governmental takings was dependent on the type of court in which the
property owner’s claim was initially filed. The Court’s discussion focused
on precedent from the case Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,2 which demanded plaintiffs
alleging a taking to unsuccessfully seek recourse through state law
procedures before they would be permitted to file a federal claim. The
Supreme Court found the Williamson County decision had created a poorly
reasoned exhaustion requirement that violated the Takings Clause and was
unworkable. In light of its findings, the Court chose not to adhere to the
principals of stare decisis and overruled Williamson County.
Part II of this Note will give a short summation of the facts and
procedural history of Knick v. Township of Scott. Part III will describe the
background and history of the relevant law on the Fifth Amendment, the
Takings Clause, and claims for compensation. Part IV will explain the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in the instant case. Part V
will argue that the outcome was rightly decided but suggests that the
Supreme Court relied on an inappropriate analysis in coming to its decision
and should have taken a formalistic approach using principles of
constitutional ripeness. Part VI will conclude that the Court in Knick v.
Township of Scott properly overruled Williamson County despite the
majority opinion’s lack of analysis regarding constitutional basis.
* Katherine Lingold is a December 2020 graduate of Mississippi College
School of Law. The author would like to sincerely thank Professor Alina Ng for her
assistance and support throughout the process of drafting this Casenote. Additionally,
the author would like to extend her appreciation to her friends and family for their
encouragement and support.
1. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
2. Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 87 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1985), overruled by Knick v.
Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2019).
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II. FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF Knick v.
Township of Scott
A. Factual Summary of Knick v. Township of Scott
In December 2012, Scott Township, Pennsylvania (“Township”)
passed an ordinance requiring “all cemeteries” to “be kept open and
accessible to the general public during daylight hours.”3 The ordinance
defined ‘cemetery’ as “a place or area of ground, whether contained on
private or public property, which ha[d] been set apart for or otherwise
utilized as a burial place for deceased human beings.”4 The ordinance gave
“code enforcement” officers authority to “enter upon any property” in order
to search for and locate cemeteries.5 Petitioner Rose Mary Knick (“Knick”)
owned a plot of land in Scott Township, Pennsylvania, comprised of her
residence and a grazing pasture for her horses and farm animals.6 Members
of the community alleged Knick’s property also contained the site of a small
graveyard where her neighbors’ ancestors were buried.7 In 2013, upon
alleged authority granted by the ordinance, a Township officer entered
Knick’s property looking for the supposed graveyard site and purportedly
discovered a cemetery with multiple grave markers.8 Thereafter, the
Township mailed Knick notice asserting she was in violation of the
ordinance by failing to open the cemetery on her property to the public
during daytime hours.9
B. Procedural History of Knick v. Township of Scott
Knick first filed a complaint in the Lackawanna County Court of
Common Pleas and requested the “court declare the ordinance
unconstitutional, void, ineffective and without force of the law; declare
Scott Township precluded from enforcing the ordinance against her and the
decree of Notice of Violation nullified; and grant equitable relief by special
injunction.”10 After the action was filed, the Township made an
3. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2168.
4. Id. Private property was included because personal property had
historically been permitted to be used for “backyard burials” for many years.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Knick v. Scott Twp., No. 3:14-CV-2223st, 2015 U.S. Dist. LESXIS
146861, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2015) aff'd sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d
310 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott,
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arrangement with Knick and agreed to withdraw the violation notice and
delay enforcement of the ordinance for the duration of state court
proceedings.11 However, as a result of that withdrawal, the state court
declared there was no longer an active enforcement action, the case was not
in the “proper posture for a decision on the requested forms of relief,” and
it was not the proper venue; and therefore, refused to rule on her action.12
Knick then filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania and requested declaratory judgment on the
grounds that the ordinance effected a Fifth Amendment taking without
compensation and deprivation of rights under statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983.13
In response, the Township filed a motion to dismiss her suit for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.14 The district court
rejected the Township’s motion and proceeded to consider the claims Knick
put forth.15
It based a portion of its decision on the United States Supreme Court
rule formed in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (“Williamson County”), construed as
requiring a claimant to pursue state procedures for seeking recourse from a
taking and for those procedures to be fruitless, before the claimant had a
valid and ripe federal claim.16 The district court concluded that Knick failed
to show the ordinance constituted a governmental taking as enacted, and
therefore dismissed her takings claim without prejudice17 for failure to meet
her burden.18

Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 204 L. Ed. 2d 558 (2019), and vacated, 932 F.3d 152 (3d
Cir. 2019).
11. Id. at *6.
12. Id.
13. Id. at *7-8. Her complaint under § 1983 contained five different claims: (1)
violation of the Fourth Amendment by the Township’s search; (2) violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment for failure to train officers; (3) Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims against Ferraro [code enforcement officer]; (4) First, Fourth, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendment claims for vagueness, penal regulation, unreasonable
provisions, public taking, nuisance, due process, and retaliation; and (5) declaratory
judgment and temporary restraining order. Id.
14. Id. at *11.
15. Id. at *19-56.
16. Id. at *42.
17. See id. at *56 (explaining the district court dismissed Count IV and V
without prejudice on the grounds that it was not certain amendment of those claims
would be futile. Instead, the court permitted Knick one opportunity to amend her
complaint in order to state a claim for relief. Conversely, the court stated Counts I-III
were dismissed with prejudice based on the belief that it would be futile to permit
amendments to such claims).
18. Id. at *32, *41-43.
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Knick subsequently amended her complaint and filed in the
Pennsylvania district court for a second time.19 Count II of Knick’s
complaint contained a Takings Clause claim and alleged that the Township
ordinance effected an uncompensated physical taking of her property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.20 The district court noted that for a
physical taking, the property owner must suffer a permanent physical
invasion of their property and the government must fail to provide the
owner just compensation.21
In its discussion on Knick’s amended complaint, the court more
heavily emphasized Williamson County precedent and the implied
exhaustion requirement, evidenced by the court’s statement that “the
federal court cannot address the merits of the claim, [until] the plaintiff
[has] satisf[ied] the unique ripeness requirements.”22 The district court
determined that Knick had yet to pursue recourse through Pennsylvania’s
state law procedure – an inverse condemnation statute,23 and as a result,
held that Knick had not satisfied the ripeness requirements.24 In response,
Knick argued she had satisfied the state procedure requirement since she
had initially filed a state court action before filing any federal complaint.25
The district court discerned that, although she had filed a state action first,
her state action had not included a petition to initiate the process for seeking
compensation, and thus failed to satisfy Williamson County requirements.26
Consequently, the court dismissed Knick’s amended complaint without
prejudice.27

19. Knick v. Scott Twp., No. 3:14-CV-02223, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121220,
at *7 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2016), aff'd sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310 (3d
Cir. 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162
(2019), vacated and remanded, 932 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2019); See id. at *10-21
(explaining Count I alleged warrantless search previously dismissed with prejudice.
Accordingly, the district court dismissed Count I with prejudice again. Count II included
a claim for a Fourth Amendment seizure violation which was already discussed and
dismissed with prejudice in the prior litigation, resulting in the court dismissing the
seizure claim with prejudice a second time. Count III sought declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief, but the court declined to grant either since Knick’s takings claim was
not ripe for consideration).
20. Id. at *11.
21. Id. at *11-12.
22. Id. at *12-13.
23. An inverse-condemnation proceeding is a state law action against a local or
state government entity for compensation of property taken. See Cowell v. Palmer Twp.,
263 F.3d 286 at *290 (3d Cir. 2001).
24. Knick, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121220 at *18
25. Id. at *16-18.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *20.
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Knick appealed the district court’s decision, on the grounds that the
court erred in requiring her to exhaust state-law remedies for
compensation.28 Knick maintained her argument that the ordinance
resulted in an uncompensated taking by mandating she open her land to the
public and to Township officers.29 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit cited Williamson County precedent as well, and asserted
that plaintiffs needed to abide by the two requirements imposed in
Williamson County: the finality rule and the state-procedure exhaustion
requirement.30 Interestingly, the court of appeals stated in a footnote that
Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement “is not a ‘true’ exhaustion
requirement, but merely addresses a unique aspect of just compensation
takings claims.”31 While defendant Township contended that Knick failed
to use inverse-condemnation procedures and failed to satisfy the exhaustion
requirement, Knick proclaimed she was not required to pursue inversecondemnation proceedings.32 Knick argued: her facial33 takings claim was
exempt from exhaustion; she had complied with Williamson County by
suing for relief in state court unsuccessfully; and in the interest of
efficiency, that the court should overlook the prudential requirements.34
In its discussion, the court of appeals specified one single situation
which excused a plaintiff from pursuing state-law exhaustion requirements:
if the plaintiff challenged the basis for the validity of an act of taking, such
as violating due process, then denial of compensation was immaterial to a
ripeness determination and Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement
did not apply.35 The claims Knick had included in her amended complaint
that were presented to the court of appeals were subject to the requirements
however, because they were claims for compensation, not claims

28. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 316-18 (3d Cir.
2017), vacated. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019), and
remanded, 932 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2019).
29. Id. at 323.
30. Id.
31. Id. n.10.
32. Id. at 323-25.
33. See id. at 324-25 (explaining the court of appeals belief that the Supreme
Court has used the word “facial” in two ways: (1) “facial taking,” and (2) “facial
challenge.” A “facial taking” is a type of taking in which the simple act of enacting a
statute effectuates a taking. Nonetheless, a “facial taking” is not automatically
considered unconstitutional; rather, it gives rise to an entity’s constitutionally based
obligation to compensate the property owner. On the other hand, a “facial challenge”
attempts to invalidate the ordinance claimed to constitute a taking, instead of providing
compensation).
34. Id. at 323.
35. Id. at 325-26.
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challenging the validity of the Township’s taking.36 Similar to the district
court’s holding, the court of appeals disagreed with Knick’s compliance
argument and found her state action had not included a request for
compensation and had not satisfied the exhaustion requirements. 37
Lastly, Knick argued permitting her claims to proceed without
returning to state court for the mere purpose of satisfying Williamson
County’s requirements would be more efficient and would avoid potential
piecemeal litigation.38 Unconvinced, the court of appeals determined the
only claim that remained in Knick’s complaint was her just compensation
claim, which showed no risk of piecemeal litigation, did not indicate any
exceptional circumstance interfered with Knick’s ability to pursue inversecondemnation proceedings, and had not identified any change in applicable
law.39 It declared that exemptions to the requirements should only be
granted in narrow circumstances and that state courts are better equipped to
calculate the amount of compensation owed.40 The court of appeals
affirmed the dismissal of Knick’s amended complaint, even though it was
suspicious of the ordinance’s constitutionality, specifically stating “it is
difficult to imagine a broader authorization to conduct searches of privately
owned property.”41
Knick proceeded to appeal the decision dismissing her complaint to
the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to review
Williamson County and reevaluate the exhaustion requirement imposed.42
The Supreme Court found that the government violated the self-executing
Takings Clause at the exact moment it took property; therefore, the property
owner had grounds for a federal takings claim at the moment of the taking.43
As a result, the Court overruled the Williamson County exhaustion
requirement and held that property owners seeking compensation under the
Fifth Amendment may bring federal claims, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims, at the time of the taking.44
36. Id. at 326.
37. Id. at 327.
38. Id. at 328.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 327-28.
41. Id. at 322, 328.
42. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. at 2169.
43. Id. at 2179.
44. Id. The Supreme Court also held a government entity violates the selfexecuting Takings Clause at the exact moment it takes property without giving the
property owner compensation; and found respondents read prior opinions too broadly
stating the Takings Clause does not stipulate compensation must in fact be paid prior to
the taking, and instead, only requires “a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for
obtaining compensation after a taking” (citing Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R.
Co., 135 U.S. 641, 659, 10 S. Ct. 965, 34 L. Ed. 295. (1890)). Id. at 2166.
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III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW ON TAKINGS AND THE
RIGHT TO COMPENSATION UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. The Ripeness Doctrine
Courts apply the “ripeness” doctrine to a multitude of claims.45 As
a general rule, the ripeness doctrine prevents a court from ruling on certain
matters, otherwise known as “unripe” matters, that for one reason or
another are not ready for review yet or that contain an injury to the plaintiff
considered too speculative.46 Courts have formed two main classifications
of “ripeness” related to property takings claims: constitutional command
ripeness and prudential ripeness.47
Constitutional command ripeness, as it pertains to the “Williamson
County ripeness puzzle” and just compensation, has been further classified
into two subcategories based on where the command comes from:
“constitutional command grounded in Article III’s case-or-controversy
limitation,” and “constitutional command grounded in the Fifth
Amendment.”48 Constitutional ripeness under Article III holds that the
statutory language of Article III “limits federal court jurisdiction to cases
and controversies… for resolution of concrete and ‘fully crystalized’
disputes.”49 Similarly, “because the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings
without just compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just
compensation has been denied,” meaning a claim is not ripe until
compensation has been intentionally denied.50 In other words, for
constitutional ripeness under the Fifth Amendment, compensation is
portrayed as a substantive element of a federal takings claim.51
Conversely, prudential ripeness rests “as a principle grounded in
policy considerations,” based on the idea that some matters “are more
appropriately resolved in another forum” or “will be better decided later.”52
Prudential ripeness has been deemed non-jurisdictional and susceptible to
exceptions consistent with policy considerations recognized by courts; for
instance, creating an exception “to enhance the accuracy of [a court’s]
decisions and to avoid [courts from] becoming embroiled in adjudications
45. Katherine Mims Crocker, A PRUDENTIAL TAKE ON A PRUDENTIAL
TAKINGS DOCTRINE, 117 Mich. L. Rev. 39, 40 (2018).
46. Id.; Katherine Mims Crocker, JUSTIFYING A PRUDENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE
WILLIAMSON COUNTY RIPENESS PUZZLE, 49 Ga. L. Rev. 163, 174 (2014).
47. Crocker, supra Note 45 at 40.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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that later may turn out to be unnecessary.”53 Relevant to the compensation
prong, federalism concerns such as a state court’s ability to decide federal
constitutional claims or a state court’s extensive experience and knowledge
with property disputes, are pertinent grounds for consideration of prudential
ripeness.54
B. Imposition of the Exhaustion Requirement and Williamson County
The takings claim exhaustion requirement was first recognized in
relation to Williamson County, but the Supreme Court had extensively
considered whether takings claims should include exhaustion requirements
three years prior in Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Florida (“Patsy”).55
Background on the Court’s opinion in Patsy is important because its
analysis was based on constitutional factors and highlighted a test for
determining whether courts were allowed to impose exhaustion
requirements. In Patsy, plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against her
employer in federal court and alleged she had been denied employment
opportunities, but the court dismissed her claim for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.56 Plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court,
where the issue posed was whether exhausting administrative remedies was
required prior to filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 federal action.57 The Court
initially rejected the theory that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims should impose
exhaustion requirements on administrative remedies, based on the federal
court’s duty to protect constitutional rights.58 Nonetheless, the Court
proceeded to review the lower courts’ rationale and analyzed reversal of the
exhaustion requirement using two factors: interpretation of the statute’s
meaning when compared to legislative history and whether congressional
intent was consistent with overruling the exhaustion requirement.59
The Supreme Court found legislative history granted Congress
complete authority to impose exhaustion requirements on federal claims
and granted courts only a very limited authority to impose exhaustion
requirements under narrow circumstances.60 However, the courts had been
vested with the authority to decide the limits of those requirements.61 The
Court determined congressional intent of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was prefaced
53. Crocker, supra Note 45, at 44; Crocker, supra Note 46 at 174.
54. Crocker, supra Note 45, at 45.
55. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
56. Id. at 496, 102 S. Ct. 2557-58.
57. Id. at 498-500.
58. Id. at 500-01.
59. Id. at 501-02.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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by the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and concluded the purpose of that Act was
to balance the protection of citizens’ federal rights with the exercise of state
powers.62 Congressional intent indicated Congress was skeptical of whether
state courts were fairly and constitutionally protecting people’s rights and
if not, Congress wanted to provide relief through access to less prejudicial
federal courts.63 Consequently, the Patsy Supreme Court held the history
underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not support the exhaustion requirement
implemented by the lower courts, especially if the requirement had
potential to prevent a plaintiff from escaping prejudice, deprivation of
rights, or threats.64
In Williamson County, respondent was a residential building
developer and petitioner was the Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission (“Commission”).65 Under Tennessee law, in order for a
developer to begin construction, their building plans needed the
Commission’s approval and approval was contingent on compliance with
the zoning ordinances and land regulations.66
The Commission
implemented new zoning ordinances and new regulations in 1973, and then
modified the zoning ordinances shortly thereafter in 1977.67
Notably, the initial building plans for the plot of land at issue were
done by respondent’s predecessor-in-interest (“developer”) and respondent
had not actually acquired the property until 1981.68 Developer submitted
an initial plan with proposed construction to the Commission in 1973.69 The
Commission approved the initial plan and construction promptly began.70
The initial plan was subsequently submitted for renewal by developer each
year from 1974 to 1977 and was approved by the Commission all four
times.71 When the plan was submitted for renewal in 1978 after the
ordinances had been modified, the Commission decided to continue
applying the original 1973 ordinances rather than the modified ordinances
62. Id. at 502-04.
63. Id. at 504-06.
64. Id. at 502-07; See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (holding 42 U.S.C § 1983 legislation was
enacted to prevent prejudice, passion, neglect, and intolerance in state courts by allowing
plaintiffs into federal court, and ruling that two necessary elements of a § 1983 claim
were that the alleged act was committed while defendant acted under state law and that
the plaintiff was deprived of a Constitutional right because of defendant’s action).
65. Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson
City, 473 U.S. at 175, overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
66. Id. at 177.
67. Id. at 178-79.
68. Id. at 177, 181.
69. Id. at 177.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 178.

2021]

KNICK V. TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT

133

and renewed approval.72 Amidst the 1979 process for renewal, the
Commission revoked its prior decision and instructed the 1977 modified
ordinances to be applied instead.73 It stated the initial plan had multiple
survey errors, included land the state had since condemned between 1973
and 1980, and failed to plan out acreage marked ‘reserved.’74 The
Commission therefore mandated that developer submit a revised initial plan
according to the 1977 ordinances.75 An updated plan was then submitted
by developer in 1980, but the Commission purportedly found eight
problems and refused to grant approval.76
After the 1980 rejection, respondent obtained ownership of the land
through foreclosure and then submitted two development plans to the
Commission.77 One plan was identical to the developer’s 1973 initial plan,
and the second was akin to the developer’s 1980 rejected plan but included
corrections and updates.78 Despite the corrections, the Commission refused
to approve either of respondent’s plans, which lead respondent to sue the
Commission in federal court on the grounds that the zoning ordinances and
regulations effected a ‘taking’ of property.79
At trial, the jury found that the Commission had denied respondent
of economically viable use of his land and that the just compensation clause
had been violated.80 The court disagreed with the jury, however, finding
that respondent was only temporarily deprived of use and thus, concluded
no taking had occurred yet. 81 Upon its findings, the court instructed
respondent to re-submit his plans and ordered the Commission to reevaluate them based on the 1973 ordinances.82 Respondent disregarded the
court’s order and appealed the decision to the Supreme Court before resubmitting his plans.83
On appeal, the Supreme Court addressed whether federal, state, and
local governments were required to compensate a property owner for an
alleged taking when the land was ‘taken’ in a temporary manner by
government regulations.84 The Commission argued a Fifth Amendment

72. Id.
73. Id. at 178-179.
74. Id. at 179.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 179-80.
77. Id. at 181.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 181-82.
80. Id. at 182-83.
81. Id. at 183.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 183-84.
84. Id. at 185.
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‘taking’ could not be interpreted to include government regulations.85 After
examination, the Court concluded respondent’s claim indicated a lack of
finality, since respondent had yet to receive a final decision on the status of
his application under the 1973 ordinances or seek any variances.86
Therefore, the Court ruled respondent’s claim premature and not ripe for
review.87
Despite the fact that the Court had already ruled respondent’s claim
premature for lack of finality, the Court needlessly continued its
examination.88 The Supreme Court declared that the Fifth Amendment did
not prohibit the taking of property altogether, rather, only prohibited taking
property without providing the owner just compensation.89 It asserted that
under the Fifth Amendment, payment for just compensation was not
required prior to or at the time of the taking, rather only a reasonable,
certain, and adequate provision for a property owner to acquire
compensation was required.90 The Court opined that a landowner did not
have a Fifth Amendment ‘takings’ claim against a state if the state had
implemented a sufficient procedure to seek compensation and use of those
procedures would result in just compensation.91 In circumstances where
zoning ordinances have effected a ‘taking,’ a Tennessee statute provided
landowners the opportunity to seek just compensation through an inverse
condemnation action.92 The Court found that Tennessee provided
85. Id. The Commission instead argued that it was a Fourteenth Amendment
violation and stated due process violations do not require “just compensation.” They
claimed a regulation which resulted in property appropriation for public use should be
viewed as violating due process rights since it is equivalent to government police powers
effecting a result only allowed by use of eminent domain powers. Id.
86. Id. at 186-94.; Furthermore, since the Court held respondent’s claim was
premature, the Court was prevented from answering the question presented. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 200.
89. Id. at 194.
90. Id. at 194-95.; See also Cherokee Nation v. S. Kan. Ry. Co., 135 U.S. 641
(1890) (holding that the Constitution did not explicitly state compensation was required
to be paid in advance and interpreted the Takings Clause to indicate a property could not
be taken or touched until a reasonable, certain and adequate procedure was in place for a
property owner to obtain compensation); Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesell-schaft,
224 U.S. 290 (1912) (holding that unless there was a specific constitutional provision
which explicitly mandated compensation be given first, all that was required was a
reasonable, just and prompt provision for the property owner to seek compensation);
Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932) (holding that the Fifth Amendment did not grant
the property owner the right to payment prior to the taking); Yearsley v. W.A. Ross
Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940) (holding that the Fifth Amendment did not give the
property owner the right to advanced compensation, especially when a statute allocating
a simple and sufficient remedy existed).
91. Id. at 195.
92. Id. at 196.

2021]

KNICK V. TOWNSHIP OF SCOTT

135

respondent the ability to file an inverse condemnation action against the
Commission, but respondent had not used the procedure or shown that it
was unavailable or inadequate.93 Thus, it concluded respondent’s ‘takings’
claim was also premature and unripe for failure to use state procedures to
obtain compensation first, and ruled respondent’s claim further precluded.94
The consequence of Williamson County’s holding was the implied creation
of a state-litigation exhaustion requirement for takings plaintiffs.95
Although the Williamson County Supreme Court had, in effect, imposed a
takings claim exhaustion requirement, the Court had not specifically called
it or referred to it as such.96
C. Evolvement of the Takings Clause and Exhaustion Requirement
After Williamson County was decided, the Supreme Court referred
to the state-litigation exhaustion requirement in the context of the ripeness
doctrine in Lucas v. South Carolina.97 Plaintiff in that case owned
beachfront property in South Carolina that he planned to build homes on,
but South Carolina Coastal Council enacted a statute which prevented him
from building on his property.98 Plaintiff filed a takings claim against the
council and alleged the statute effected a taking of property without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.99 In
the process of concluding that the statute effected a taking of plaintiff’s
property for loss of economically beneficial use, the Supreme Court stated
the Williamson County requirements “went only to the prudential ‘ripeness’
of” the claim.100 However, the Court had not elaborated any further as to
why it declared the requirements prudential.101
The Supreme Court then cited the Williamson County exhaustion
requirement in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, where it called
the requirements “prudential hurdles.”102 Opposite of Lucas, the Suitum
93. Id. at 196-97. See also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. Los Angeles Cty., Cal., 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (affirming that advanced
compensation was not required prior to a taking, ruling in opposition of Williamson
County, and stating that an immediate constitutional claim for a taking has arisen at the
time of a taking because the Constitution required just compensation and there was an
implied agreement to pay in the choice to act under the Takings Clause).
94. Id. at 200.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
98. Id. at 1008.
99. Id. at 1009.
100. Id. at 1013.
101. Id.
102. Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733-734 (1997).
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Court explained that the “compensation hurdle” which required exhaustion
“stems from the Fifth Amendment's provison that only takings without ‘just
compensation’ infringe that Amendment.”103 Nonetheless, the Court’s
holding in Suitum was decided on finality grounds and had not warranted
further discussion on compensation.104
Subsequently, the Supreme Court encountered Williamson County’s
exhaustion requirement in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San
Francisco, California where it addressed whether a federal court was
allowed to create a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause exception to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause.105 Interestingly, though the Court had referred to
the exhaustion requirement as ‘prudential’ in prior cases, it omitted any
consideration of the ripeness doctrine in San Remo. Petitioners owned the
San Remo Hotel (“Hotel”) in San Francisco and had leased it to be run and
operated as a bed and breakfast inn.106 Years after petitioners bought the
hotel, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors (“Board”) enacted an
ordinance to regulate conversions of residential hotel units into tourist
units.107 The ordinance required conversion permits and stated a permit
would only be given for building new units, restoring old units, or when the
builder paid the city an ‘in lieu’ fee.108 When petitioners submitted an
application for a conversion permit, the Board approved their permit, but
conditioned approval on payment of a hefty ‘in lieu’ fee.109 Petitioners then
filed an action against the Board in the federal district court and asserted
claims under both federal and state law on the grounds that the ordinance
effected a ‘taking’ as applied to their hotel, which the Board responded to
by filing for summary judgment.110
The district court determined petitioners’ claims were premature
and granted the Board’s summary judgment motion.111 Petitioners
appealed and specifically asked the court of appeals to only rule on the issue
of whether the claims were premature and not to rule on their substantive
federal claims, since those federal claims would become moot if the case
moved to state court.112 The court agreed, and then affirmed the lower
courts’ decision that the takings claim was premature due to petitioners’
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323,
125 S. Ct. 2491, 2495 (2005).
106. Id. at 327-28
107. Id. at 328.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 328-29.
110. Id. at 330.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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failure to use state inverse condemnation proceedings.113 However, the
court also granted petitioners the ability to raise their federal claims in
federal court at a later time, but stipulated they had to specifically reserve
that right in state court.114
Thereafter, petitioners filed a complaint in state court which listed
additional claims not included in their initial federal complaint and the court
dismissed the complaint entirely.115 Upon further examination, the state
court found that the additional claims were similar in structure to the federal
claims and had not been specifically reserved by petitioners like the federal
court of appeals had instructed.116 Therefore, the state court deduced that it
had in fact handed down a judgment on petitioners’ federal claims
simultaneously with their state claims.117 Petitioners appealed the decision
to the California Supreme Court, but the decision to dismiss the complaint
was upheld.118 Rather than appeal the state court decision to the United
States Supreme Court, petitioners went back to the federal district court and
amended their initial federal complaint.119 The district court subsequently
held that petitioners’ claims were barred by issue preclusion on the grounds
that their complaint contained claims previously adjudicated in state
court.120
Essentially, petitioners’ claims were dismissed after filing in federal
court, but petitioners were also granted the ability to reserve those claims
during the required state proceedings.121 Nonetheless, after petitioners
proceeded through state court and later filed in federal court, their claims
were barred on the grounds of issue preclusion.122 Petitioners appealed to
the Supreme Court and argued that federal courts should give zero
deference to state court decisions regarding takings claims in order to ensure
decisions on the merits.123 They based their argument on the fact that the
Court in Williamson County held a property owner could not even attempt
to get into federal court until compensation had been denied through state
procedures.124

113. Id. at 330-31.
114. Id. at 331.
115. Id. at 332.
116. Id. at 331.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 331-32.
119. Id. at 334.
120. Id. at 335.
121. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323,
125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005).
122. Id. at 334.
123. Id. at 338.
124. Id. at 341-42.
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The Supreme Court noted that courts can only make a departure
from traditional rules of preclusion, such as a Takings Clause exception
from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, when Congress specifically stated or
indicated it was allowed.125 Further, the Court disagreed with petitioners’
argument regarding entry into federal court and stated that not all takings
plaintiffs deserved a day in federal court.126 It found Congress had not
given any authority for departure from preclusion rules for takings actions,
and therefore, ruled federal courts were not allowed to disregard the Full
Faith and Credit Clause for the sole purpose of ensuring every takings
plaintiff had a chance in federal court.127 Additionally, the Court
determined that petitioners could have refrained from including language
resembling their federal claims in their state action and prevented
preclusion issues, but they failed to do so.128 For these reasons, the Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint.129 San Remo Hotel
reaffirmed the Williamson County exhaustion requirement and denied that
such exhaustion requirement created a catch-twenty-two preclusion issue
in that case, though it was denied inadvertently without using “ripeness”
verbiage.130
On the contrary, the concurring opinion written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, did specifically discuss the ripeness doctrine.131 Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that the Williamson County Court had “purported to
interpret the Fifth Amendment in divining this state-litigation
requirement,” but “recently, we have referred to it as merely a prudential
requirement.”132 He went further and explained it was “not obvious that
either constitutional or prudential principles require claimants to utilize all
state compensation procedures before they can bring a federal takings
claim,” and cited Patsy’s holding that concluded exhaustion was not
required for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.133
Classification of Williamson County’s requirement then evolved
more in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection, where the Supreme Court declared that the
compensation prong of takings claims was non-jurisdictional.134 In that
125. Id. at 344-45.
126. Id. at 336-39.
127. Id. at 344-45.
128. Id. at 345-46.
129. Id. at 342-47.
130. Id. at 341-47.
131. Id. at 348-49. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S.
702, 130 S. Ct. 2592, 177 L. Ed. 2d 184 (2010).
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case, the issue before the Court was whether judicial action could violate
the Takings Clause wherein respondents argued that petitioner’s takings
claim was unripe because petitioner had not attempted to seek recourse
through state procedures and thus, had not satisfied the requirements of
Williamson County.135 The Court disagreed with respondents and held that
it could waive both the finality and exhaustion requirements “since neither
is jurisdictional,” and ultimately concluded there had not been a taking.136
The idea of applying jurisdiction principles to the exhaustion
requirement was noted again in Horne v. Department of Agriculture.137
Although the main issue there revolved around the Tucker Act, the
Supreme Court stated “a Fifth Amendment claim is premature until it is
clear that the Government has both taken property and denied just
compensation. Although we often refer to this consideration as ‘prudential
ripeness,’ we have recognized that it is not, strictly speaking,
jurisdictional.”138 Therefore, as of the time Knick was brought in front of
the Supreme Court on appeal, the Court appeared to interpret Williamson
County’s exhaustion requirement as a prudential ripeness factor but had yet
to make a clear, overarching declaration stating such.139

135. Id. at 727-29.
136. Id. at 729.
137. Horne v. Dep't of Agric., 569 U.S. 513, 133 S. Ct. 2053, 186 L. Ed. 2d 69
(2013).
138. Id. at 525-26. Additionally, a federal district court was met with a removal
situation in 2014 which narrowed the application of the exhaustion requirement for 42
U.S.C. § 1983 takings claims when defendants motioned for removal. Athanasiou v.
Town of Westhampton, 30 F. Supp. 3d 84 (D. Mass. 2014). In Athanasiou v. Town of
Westhampton, plaintiffs filed their action in state court first, in Massachusetts Superior
Court, as required under Williamson County, and combined a federal 42 U.S.C. § 1983
takings claim with state claims. Id. at 86-87. Defendants then successfully motioned to
remove the case to federal court. Id. After the case was removed to the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, defendants filed to dismiss the case
entirely, arguing plaintiffs had failed to meet Williamson County exhaustion
requirements. Id. at 87. Plaintiffs vehemently opposed dismissal, insisting that they
attempted to meet exhaustion requirements, but defendants had interfered by filing a
removal motion and were the direct cause of the failure to exhaust state law
requirements. Id. The district court agreed and held defendant’s removal of the 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claim to federal court acted as a waiver of the state law exhaustion requirement.
Id. at 88-89. The district court reasoned that if it had held otherwise, defendants would be
able to manipulate litigation and plaintiffs would be subjected to undue hardship. Id.
139. Williamson Cty, 473 U.S. at 727-29.
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IV. INSTANT CASE: Knick v. Township of Scott
A. Majority Opinion
The ruling handed down by the United States Supreme Court
ultimately addressed whether consequences of Williamson County
necessitated overruling precedent or if principals of stare decisis compelled
adherence to Williamson County precedent. 140 To make a determination
on that issue, the Court initially considered the Fifth Amendment and
clarified whether a plaintiff whose property was taken by governmental
action was required to pursue recourse through state procedures before the
property owner had standing to bring a federal claim. 141
1. Merits of the Williamson County Holding
The Supreme Court first considered the merits of Williamson
County, specifically when a federal claim was vested, when an exhaustion
requirement was formed, and when compensation needed to be paid.142 The
Court held that a property owner’s federal claim for a taking was vested at
the moment the taking occurred and could be immediately filed in federal
court.143 It initially looked to the language of the Takings Clause and
distinguished that the clause merely said “without just compensation,” and
did not include the phrase “without an available procedure that will result
in compensation.”144 The Court interpreted the clause’s statutory language
to mean a property owner was deprived of a constitutional right when they
were without payment.145 Therefore, a federal claim, such as a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim, was permitted to be filed in federal court when the government
took property without the property owner receiving payment, regardless of
any state law procedures the might have been available for recourse.146
Next, the Court referenced the Tucker Act, a federal statute which
granted the right to file a claim for compensation from takings committed
by the United States government.147 The Court explained case law that
interpreted the Act defined “the act of taking” as “the event which gives
140. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2169, 2177, 204 L.
Ed. 2d 558 (2019).
141. Id. at 2168.
142. Id. at 2169-77.
143. Id. at 2170.
144. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2170, 204 L. Ed. 2d
558 (2019).
145. Id. at 2170, 204 L. Ed. 2d 558.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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rise to the claim for compensation.”148 From this, the Court deduced that
when the United States government committed a taking, the property
owner’s claim for compensation that followed undoubtedly fell under the
Tucker Act federal statute, and thus, the claim for compensation
automatically was deemed based on the Constitution and within the federal
court’s jurisdiction.149
The Court continued its analysis and referenced Jacobs, which held
that when compensation is paid to the property owner at a later time after
the taking had occurred, the amount of compensation must equal the same
amount as if the property owner had been paid at the time of taking,
including interest.150 It stated that Jacobs’ holding indicated the right to
compensation under the Fifth Amendment was ripe at the moment the act
of taking was committed, regardless of any remedial measures the property
owner had after the taking occurred.151 The Court’s opinion in Knick
declared the Jacobs holding was analogous and the same principles applied
to state and local government takings.152 The Fifth Amendment was the
tool that actually granted the constitutional right to just compensation for a
taking, but statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was a vehicle that provided a property
owner with a procedure to invoke that right.153 As compared to Jacobs,
since the right to compensation under the Fifth Amendment was ripe at the
moment of a taking, if the property owner had not received compensation
as of the time of taking, then the property owner was deprived of the
constitutional right to compensation at that time.154 This meant a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 deprivation of rights claim was simultaneously ripe at the time the
taking occurred and was unencumbered by state procedures for obtaining
compensation.155 Specifically, the Court held that a state law inverse
condemnation action or state law otherwise providing a method for
recourse, did not impact the property owner’s right to federal constitutional
claims.156 The Court found that Williamson County’s view of the Takings
Clause was in direct contravention to Jacobs.157 Williamson County had
concluded that the existence of a state law which granted just compensation
disqualified a property owner’s constitutional right to a federal claim and

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2170-72.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2171.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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delayed that right until the owner had exhausted use of the state
procedures.158
To further support its ruling, the Supreme Court cited First English
which had referred to the Takings Clause as having a “self-executing
character,” meaning as soon as the taking occurred, the property owner was
vested with a constitutional claim for just compensation.159 Thus, on the
question of when a claim vested, the Court concluded property owners were
entitled to file a federal claim for deprivation of the right to compensation
at the point the taking occurred.160
Next, in considering when the exhaustion requirement was formed,
the Supreme Court determined that Williamson County imposed the
exhaustion requirement when it ordered property owners to exhaust state
procedures for compensation as a pre-requisite to filing in federal court.161
The Williamson County Court relied on interpretation of the Takings Clause
for its ruling, and formed such interpretation based on Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co. (“Monsanto”),162 which led the Supreme Court to review
Monsanto.163 The Court was not fond of Williamson County’s analogy and
stated the Monsanto case was not a takings claim for just compensation,
rather, it involved a takings claim which sought injunction of a federal
statute.164 The Monsanto Court stated that procedures for compensation
were available for plaintiff and held that equitable relief, such as an
injunction, did not apply to a takings claim when the property owner could
bring an action for just compensation.165 The Knick Court agreed with
Monsanto on that point, finding precedent stated the availability of
monetary relief prevented equitable relief.166
The Monsanto Court further stated that if procedures led to just
compensation, then no taking had occurred and the property owner did not
have a takings claim against the government.167 The Knick Court disagreed
with the Monsanto Court’s contention that compensation negated the
existence of a takings claim and explained that compensation did not negate

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2172-73.
161. Id. at 2173.
162. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 104 S. Ct. 2862, 81 L. Ed. 2d
815 (1984).
163. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2173-74 (2019).
164. Id. at 2173.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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the claim, but instead remedied the takings claim once it had been paid to
the property owner.168
The Williamson County Court also referenced Monsanto in an
attempt to make a comparison in which it alleged that only once a property
owner whose property had been ‘taken’ by the United States government
had employed the Tucker Act procedures, had a federal takings claim fully
matured.169 The Court did not agree and clarified that an action for just
compensation under the Tucker Act was in fact a Fifth Amendment takings
claim, not a separate pre-requisite; and thus, once a property owner was
denied compensation under the Tucker Act, there was nowhere else to
turn.170 Additionally, the it emphasized that only Congress had the power
to implement exhaustion requirements, not states.171
The Knick Court accredited a portion of the hapless ruling made in
Williamson County to the circumstances surrounding the decision and
explained that it was possible the Court failed to reasonably analyze the
logic underlying the state litigation requirement or the potential impacts.172
It suggested that Williamson County should have been decided solely on the
grounds that the property owner brought suit before a final decision had
been made regarding a taking by government regulations and the Court
should not have continued to consider the effect of state procedures or any
other basis.173
The Supreme Court’s third consideration on the merits of
Williamson County addressed whether compensation must be paid prior to
the act of taking.174 Respondent in the instant case argued that takings
which are initially uncompensated, but which allow compensation at a later
point, are not in violation of the Fifth Amendment at the point taking
occurs.175 However, the Court contended the cases Respondent cited in
support of its argument included claims for injunctive relief and deemed
those cases inapplicable, on the grounds that an equitable remedy as such
could not be used because an action for monetary compensation was
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2174.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2173. See also Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). The Williamson County Court also relied on
Parratt v. Taylor (“Parratt”), which the Supreme Court found unpersuasive. Knick, 139 S.
Ct. at 2174. The Court believed Parratt had nothing to do with takings claims, since it
dealt with a prisoner barred from bringing a due process claim under § 1938 where there
was a sufficient post-deprivation state procedure and emphasized that even Williamson
County recognized the Parratt analogy was far-fetched. Id. at 2174.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 2174-75.
175. Id.
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available.176 It also noted that the fact that a property owner was prohibited
from injunctive relief at the time of taking did not also mean that the
Takings Clause had not been violated at that time.177
The Knick Court then dove into the history of the Takings Clause
and found the Framers of the Constitution intended to prevent the federal
government from taking private property without providing payment for
said property.178 It stressed that the Framers did not intend for the
government to permissibly take possession of property while the owner
awaited future compensation.179 The Court concluded Williamson County
had made its ruling incorrectly.180 When the government, whether federal
or local, had taken property and failed to compensate the property owner,
the government violated the Takings Clause and the property owner was
entitled to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as of the time of taking.181
Since the Court determined the Takings Clause and the Fifth Amendment
were concurrently violated at the time property was taken, a property owner
was permitted to file a federal claim in pursuit of a remedy without waiting
for judgment in a state action.182 The Supreme Court held the Williamson
County Court erred in holding otherwise.183
2. Adhering to or Departing from Stare Decisis
The Supreme Court in Knick explained that the stare decisis
doctrine generally meant the Court should rule in favor of precedent, and
was premised on the theory that it was usually more pertinent to settle the
applicable rule of law than to ensure it was settled correctly.184 The Court
noted the doctrine was given the least deference when applied to holdings
that interpreted a portion of the Constitution because those holdings could
only be altered by a Supreme Court decision or a constitutional
amendment.185 This was the case with the Williamson County decision, as
it had interpreted the Fifth Amendment.186 The majority opinion identified
four factors it evaluated for assessing whether overruling a decision was
appropriate: the quality of the decision’s reasoning, the workability of the
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 2175-77.
179. Id. at 2176.
180. Id. at 2177.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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established rule, if it was consistent with related decisions, and the level of
reliance on the decision.187 It concluded all four factors weighed in favor
of overruling Williamson County and against stare decisis.188
For the first factor, the Court held the reasoning behind Williamson
County was extremely baseless and had conflicted with prior rulings on
takings claims.189 It also declared Williamson County Court’s significant
conclusion, which stated a property owner had a federal action for a takings
claim only once they had been denied compensation in a state law action,
had come from superfluous language in the Monsanto decision.190 The
Court further stated the Williamson County decision disregarded Jacobs
and a multitude of other cases that held a right to compensation under the
Fifth Amendment was vested in a property owner at the time the taking
occurred.191
Regarding the second factor, the Williamson County decision was
found especially unworkable after San Remo,192 where the decision had a
preclusive effect and prevented property owners from bringing a federal
action for compensation after rejection in state court.193 The consequence
of San Remo was significant considering the potential multitude of property
owners that would be prevented from litigating a federal takings claim
provided for by 42 U.S.C. § 1983.194 The majority opinion then addressed
the dissent’s contention that an “enhanced” form of stare decisis should
have been applied to Williamson County and then Congress could have
amended the Full Faith and Credit Clause to remove the preclusion trap
issue seen in San Remo.195 The majority opinion rebutted this by pointing
out that even if Congress had made such an amendment, property owners
with takings claims still would have been erroneously required to file a state
action for compensation before filing any federal action under Williamson
County.196
Under the third factor, the Court explicitly noted that the decision
of Williamson County had not been very consistent upon finding the
justification for Williamson County’s ruling had varied over the previous

187. Id. at 2178.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, Cal., 545 U.S. 323
(2005).
193. Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162 at 2178-79.
194. Id. at 2179.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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thirty (30) years and continued to evolve, for example some courts had
recast the requirement as prudential.197
Lastly, in addressing the fourth factor, the Supreme Court found no
reliance interests since the weight of stare decisis was reduced when dealing
with rulings that had no relevance to issues of lawful behavior.198 The Court
stated the government would not be subjected to new liability as a result of
overruling Williamson County, rather the new rule merely gave property
owners the option of filing federal claims for takings they would have
otherwise had to file in state court as inverse condemnation actions.199
After the Knick majority opinion fully analyzed both questions
posed on appeal, the Court overruled Williamson County and the state
litigation exhaustion requirement imposed within it.200 The Court stipulated
that a property owner was permitted to file a federal takings action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 at the time the taking occurred and deprived the owner of
compensation, without first having to pursue remedies through the state
courts.201
B. Concurring Opinion
The concurring opinion, written by Justice Thomas, focused on a
theory he referred to as the “sue me approach” put forth by the United States
as amicus curiae.202 He pointed to the United States’ argument that the
government’s implicit promise to compensate a property owner for taking
property would be sufficient if the owner was able to sue the government
and win.203 Contrary to such argument, Justice Thomas noted the Fifth
Amendment did not provide recourse only to property owners who were
willing to go through the hassle of suing the government to obtain
compensation.204 Rather, he stated the “sue me approach” could not be
supported because the Fifth Amendment had a prerequisite which
commanded just compensation be given to a property owner in order for
the government to have authority to take property.205 Justice Thomas
further alleged that a government’s refusal to compensate a property owner
could be found tortious in addition to being unconstitutional.206 He also
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 2179-80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2180.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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agreed with the majority opinion that the injunction concerns argued by the
United States were misplaced and moot.207 On the other hand, Justice
Thomas believed that when the court determined a particular plaintiff was
entitled to relief, that did not mean the challenged regulatory scheme as a
whole would be enjoined or invalidated, but was actually evaluated on a
case by case basis; thus implying completely overruling Williamson County
may not have been necessary.208
C. Dissenting Opinion
1. Overruling Williamson County
The dissent, written by Justice Kagan, took the stance that
Williamson County was decided correctly, supported by precedent, and
should not have been overruled.209 She interpreted the Williamson County
decision as having ruled that a government was allowed to take property
from an owner as long as there was a sufficient procedure to provide just
compensation to the property owner, even if the actual payment transaction
was not conducted until after the government had already committed the
taking.210 Justice Kagan stated the majority’s decision disregarded
Williamson County and many other prior decisions, based on the belief that
it implied that any instance in which a government had taken property and
had not compensated the owner in advance was a violation of the
Constitution, regardless of whether the government had proven prior to the
taking that it was able and dedicated to paying the owner after.211
In support of her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan first referenced
the words and meaning of the Taking Clause.212 Her interpretation was that
the Takings Clause conferred the right to be free from the government
taking property only when the government failed to pay the property owner
just compensation.213 Therefore, the dissent disagreed with the majority’s
implication that the Takings Clause gave property owners the right to be
free from all property takings by the government.214 Justice Kagan argued
the Takings Clause was different than other clauses in the Bill of Rights
based on the premise that sovereignty included the inherent power to take

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 2180-81.
211. Id. at 2181.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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private property for public use.215 She claimed that unlike other guarantees
contained in the Bill of Rights, the Takings Clause did not make it unlawful
for the government to take property, but rather allowed such takings as long
as the government justly compensated the property owner.216
The dissent further disagreed with the majority opinion on the
elements required for a violation of the Takings Clause.217 Justice Kagan
alleged there were two elements that must have been present before a
violation had occurred: there must have been a taking of property by the
government and the government must have refused to pay the owner just
compensation.218 The dissenting opinion believed that until the government
had withheld and denied payment, there was no constitutional violation.219
Additionally, Justice Kagan claimed that the majority opinion
dismantled the Court’s prior ruling regarding the threshold boundary that
determined when the government’s action of withholding compensation
resulted in a constitutional violation.220 In support of her argument, Justice
Kagan relied on the case Cherokee Nation, also cited within the majority
opinion.221 However, she emphasized the court in that decision held
payment in advance of the taking was not a required stipulation in the
Takings Clause, but rather, delayed payment was acceptable, conditioned
on the government providing a tenable, definite and sufficient method for
the owner to be given compensation.222 Justice Kagan argued that such
ideas had been reiterated and followed for decades, yet were not followed
in the majority opinion.223
In examining Williamson County, the dissenting opinion argued the
Court there followed the precedent set up by Cherokee Nation.224 Justice
Kagan noted the state in that case, Tennessee, had implemented an inverse
condemnation action which allowed the builder to sue for compensation
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. The majority subsequently acknowledged the dissent’s argument in the
instant case, in which the dissent put forth a defense that supported the original rationale
behind Williamson County and claimed no violation of the Fifth Amendment existed,
until a property owner was denied compensation. Majority stated that the dissent went
beyond the respondent’s argument in the instant case and argued there was no support for
the dissent’s view in any of the repeated Supreme Court holdings, which ruled just
compensation was a constitutional right given to property owners that vested at the
moment the taking occurred. Id. at 2174-75. (majority opinion).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 2181-82.
221. Id. at 2182.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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after a taking, but the builders chose to file action in federal court through
the Takings Clause instead.225 She claimed the Williamson County Court
found the Fifth Amendment only prohibited takings without just
compensation, and that the Amendment only required the availability of a
tenable, definite and sufficient procedure through which an owner can seek
compensation.226 Justice Kagan further alleged that Court held that the
inverse condemnation procedure was sufficient and the government did not
actually deny compensation to the property owner until the state procedure
was used and had not resulted in compensation.227 Therefore, she
concluded the government had not violated the Takings Clause at the point
the builder filed the federal action.228 The dissenting opinion argued the
Williamson County decision had not resulted in any new rulings that could
not be found in prior decisions, other than the Court ruling that the state
implemented inverse condemnation procedure qualified as tenable and
sufficient, and that the particular statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, required a
property owner to unsuccessfully attempt the inverse condemnation
procedure.229
Justice Kagan insisted that contrary to majority opinion’s belief,
repeated decisions held rejection of compensation was a second required
element for a violation of the Takings Clause to arise.230 Overall, the
dissent disagreed with the majority opinion’s decision to not follow
Williamson County’s holding and stated in the process of ruling as such, it
also disregarded and destroyed over a hundred years of precedent.231
2. Stare Decisis
The dissenting opinion also strongly believed stare decisis should
have been followed.232 Justice Kagan listed four factors, different factors
than those listed by the majority opinion, that she believed the majority
opinion had used in overruling Williamson County, which included:
comparing takings claims with other constitutional claims, interpreting the
words of the Takings Clause, asserting a belief to not read precedent too
broadly, and construing theories from prior decisions involving the Tucker
Act.233
225. Id. at 2182-83.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2183.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2190.
233. Id. at 2183-84.
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First, the dissent argued that the majority’s declaration that the Bill
of Rights treated takings claims worse than the other claims it contained
was without merit.234 Justice Kagan stated the Takings Clause
distinguished two elements required for a claim in a similar manner to
other Bill of Rights claims, meaning the clause was equivalent and did not
treat takings plaintiffs any worse.235 Second, the dissenting opinion
pointed to the text of the Takings Clause and argued that although it did
not explicitly contain verbiage that specifically allowed subsequent
payment when certain procedures existed, it also did not explicitly state
advanced or immediate payment was required as the majority opinion
suggested.236 Third, the dissent claimed that the courts in prior decisions
did not intentionally focus on the type of relief sought, but rather the courts
merely intended to convey that injunctions could not be granted because
there were other procedures in place which provided monetary
compensation and a plaintiff was required to seek compensatory damages
first.237
Fourth, Justice Kagan disagreed with the majority opinion’s ruling
that takings claims were claims for Fifth Amendment violations, and
argued such a ruling was based on the incorrect finding that advanced or
contemporaneous payment was required.238 The dissent contended that
since advanced payment was not required and takings claims could not be
brought until payment was denied, takings claims in fact were not the
same as claims for Fifth Amendment violations.239 Justice Kagan
adamantly believed the majority opinion overruled years of precedent in
the instant case, and alleged that when overruling such a substantial
amount of precedent, the Court should have considered that its theory may
not have been accurate.240
The dissenting opinion also declared that majority’s decision will
result in two other damaging consequences: it will turn innocent
government officials into violators and it will undermine underlying
principles of judicial federalism.241 Justice Kagan alleged that innocent
officials would be violators since there was no longer a formula to predict
when government actions would effect a taking and resulted in an inability
to have advanced knowledge of a certain proposed program’s chance of

234. Id. at 2184.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2184-85.
238. Id. at 2186.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2186-87.
241. Id. at 2187.
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amounting to a taking.242 The dissent reasoned judicial federalism was
undermined because the decision acted as a door into federal courts by
giving federal courts jurisdiction over takings claims which Justice Kagan
thought should be decided in state court.243
Lastly, the dissenting opinion argued the preclusion trap issue
considered by the majority opinion could have alternatively been corrected
by Congress.244 As another alternative option, Justice Kagan argued that at
any point, Congress could have implemented legislation that would allow a
plaintiff to bring an action in federal court after an unsuccessful attempt in
state court, and effectively reverse the preclusion trap problem.245 Justice
Kagan alleged that previous Justices had stated the Court should not
overrule precedent even in instances of serious error.246 Ultimately, the
dissent’s argument was based on an opinion that stare decisis should have
been strictly followed in the majority’s decision and Williamson County
should not have been overruled.247
V. ANALYSIS OF Knick v. Township of Scott
In Knick v. Township of Scott, the Supreme Court took up an issue
that had been addressed by a multitude of courts through varying and
inconsistent methods and was in dire need of clarification. The outcome of
the case hinged on the Court’s interpretation of the Takings Clause and
whether the just compensation provision was a general command or a
required element of takings claim. The majority opinion was correct in
holding property owners with takings claims were not obligated to first
pursue state remedies, though arriving at the correct conclusion was
happenstance because the Court should have taken a formalistic approach
in its analysis by classifying the exhaustion requirement as constitutional
ripeness or prudential ripeness.
A. Two Classifications Under the Ripeness Doctrine: Constitutional and
Prudential
Classifying ripeness and distinguishing between the categories of
constitutional and prudential is important for selecting the type of analysis
a court should apply and the resulting impact of a holding. Williamson
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2189.
245. Id. at 2189-90.
246. Id. at 2189.
247. Id. at 2190.
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County was an intricate case that had not explicitly categorized the type of
state-litigation requirement it imposed. As a result, there was a resounding
difficulty throughout courts which attempted to interpret the opinion
thereafter. Williamson County articulated two rules allegedly linked to the
Takings Clause: first, the finality prong requires a definitive conclusion
stating a taking occurred; and second, the just compensation prong requires
denial of compensation through state procedures. However, it was not clear
whether these two rules were derived from the language of the Fifth
Amendment or based on policy considerations related to takings claims.
If Williamson County surmised that the statutory language of the
Fifth Amendment included the compensation exhaustion requirement, then
the requirement would have been classified under constitutional ripeness.
The ensuing impact would have meant litigants did not have a vested
constitutional right to a federal takings claim until they pursued state
procedures unsuccessfully.
One significance of classifying it as
constitutional is that courts would not have authority to make exceptions to
the state-law requirement.
On the other hand, if justification for Williamson County’s
requirement was based on policy considerations, it would have been
classified as a prudential ripeness prong. The significant difference in
classifying the state-law requirement as prudential ripeness would have
meant the requirement was non-jurisdictional, and therefore, courts would
have been able to make exceptions and waive the exhaustion requirement.
As explained supra, in the Patsy case decided three years prior to
Williamson County, the Supreme Court had looked to the statutory language
and congressional intent underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
determined the language of the statute did not explicitly command
exhaustion of state procedures and found Congress had intended to protect
citizens’ federal rights to constitutional claims and to ensure fairness
throughout courts. Therefore, the Supreme Court had specifically declared
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not allow courts to impose exhaustion
requirements. Yet, this was exactly what the Williamson County Court had
done, completely disregarding its ruling from only three years prior.
Post-Williamson County, the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South
Carolina had classified the exhaustion requirement as a prudential ripeness
factor. However, the Court there had not explained its rationale or
justification for labeling as prudential ripeness. Then in Suitum, the Court
had done the same thing and referred to the Williamson County
requirements as “prudential hurdles” but gave little indication as to why it
had chosen that description. A few years later, the Court’s opinion in San
Remo then lacked any reference to whether the Williamson County
exhaustion requirement was a constitutional or prudential ripeness factor.
Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in San Remo had
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pointed out the lack of discussion on ripeness by the majority and noted his
concern that the ripeness doctrine as applied to Williamson County had
created issues. After San Remo, the Court in Stop the Beach made the
distinction that the Williamson County requirement was non-jurisdictional,
which indicated prudential ripeness. Lastly, in Horne, the Court reiterated
its belief that the exhaustion requirement was prudential and nonjurisdictional.
Overall, by the time Knick arrived before the Supreme Court thirtyfour (34) years after Williamson County was handed down, the exhaustion
requirement that was presumably derived from language in the Fifth
Amendment had mysteriously evolved into a prudential ripeness prong.
This begged the question: which classification was proper and how should
Williamson County be handled going forward?
B. Unclassified Exhaustion Requirement and the Resulting Convoluted
Opinion
In Knick, the majority opinion’s failure to classify or interpret
Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement led to a convoluted and
contradictory discussion. The Court posed the issue in two parts: one part
looked at what was required for a claim based on a violation of the Takings
Clause, and the other part assessed whether to overrule Williamson County
or follow the principals of stare decisis.
The first part alluded to the exhaustion requirement of Williamson
County, and led the Court to analyze the underlying basis of the
requirement. It was at this point that the Court should have begun its
discussion with ripeness classification in order to determine the appropriate
analysis. Instead, the majority opinion jumped right into its arguments, and
did so in an unmethodical and arbitrary manner. The only statement
regarding ripeness that the majority opinion made was deep within its
discussion and said “We eventually abandoned the view that the
requirement is an element of a takings claim and recast it as a ‘prudential’
ripeness rule… No party defends that approach here.” That statement
indicates first, that the Court had initially regarded Williamson County’s
exhaustion requirement as a constitutional ripeness prong; and second, that
the Court may not have been convinced it was prudential, but the Court did
not elaborate any further. Consequently, the majority opinion lacked
direction and improperly addressed a combination of principles from both
constitutional ripeness and prudential ripeness.
Prudential ripeness factors emerge from the majority opinion’s
ultimate conclusions that “the state-litigation requirement imposes an
unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs, conflicts with the rest of our
takings jurisprudence, and must be overruled;” and “[f]idelity to the
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Takings Clause and our cases construing it requires overruling Williamson
County and restoring takings claims to the full-fledged constitutional status
the Framers envisioned when they included the Clause.” Each of these
statements are focused on policy considerations such as fairness, justice,
efficiency, and loyalty.
On the other hand, the majority opinion also supported its decision
with references to the Fifth Amendment, the Takings Clause, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The Court examined the three statutes and determined whether
statutory language and/or legislative intent underlying each statute required
exhaustion of state remedies. Applying these principles is directly in-line
with constitutional ripeness predicated on commands of the Fifth
Amendment.
Looking at the majority opinion in its entirety, it conflates the
doctrines of constitutional ripeness and prudential ripeness by using
constitutional factors to support a prudential-based holding, but a rule
cannot be both. The Knick majority opinion conducted an improper
analysis which could have led to an inappropriate, invalid, and potentially
unconstitutional ruling, though luckily it did not in the instant case.
Furthermore, the impact of Knick could be problematic for future
courts attempting to understand and interpret its holding, in search of
justification and direction on how to apply its rule going forward; especially
considering it overturned such a long-standing rule.
C. Proper Classification of the Exhaustion Requirement as a
Constitutional Command
For a more proper and legally sound conclusion, the majority
opinion should have focused its analysis on formalistic principles within the
ripeness doctrine. More specifically, it should have classified the
exhaustion requirement under constitutional ripeness and used the
respective principles, as indicated by four factors arising from case
precedent. First, the fact that the Court acknowledged the requirement had
been “recast” as prudential shows the Court originally perceived it as
constitutional ripeness. Second, the structure of the Court’s analysis in
Williamson County is rooted in constitutional command principles. Third,
San Remo precedent cited within Knick implied principals of constitutional
ripeness. If the proper classification of ripeness had been applied, that being
constitutional ripeness, the analysis that followed would have shown that
Williamson County’s requirement inhibited plaintiff’s constitutional rights
and necessitated overruling.
In majority’s discussion, it implied the exhaustion requirement was
constitutionally commanded ripeness originally, and that court opinions
have caused the requirement to evolve into prudential ripeness. While that
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may have been true, the majority opinion did not support such conjecture
with reasons that warranted reclassification of the requirement. Moreover,
the cases that have referred to Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement
as prudential have failed to justify their doing so and have been
foundationless conjectures. Therefore, there was no basis for the ripeness
classification to evolve.
Next, the details of the Court’s discussion in Williamson County
were centered around its interpretations of the Fifth Amendment. It
addressed whether the statutory language of the Takings Clause required
just compensation and at what point the clause mandated compensation be
given. It then tied the commands from the Takings Clause to the
deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and concluded that a takings
plaintiff was not deprived of a right within the meaning of the statutes until
they had been deprived of compensation. These factors are situated within
the principles of constitutional command ripeness, and thus, lead to the
conclusion that the exhaustion requirement as imposed by Williamson
County was a constitutional ripeness requirement.
Lastly, San Remo indicated exhaustion was a constitutional ripeness
requirement through its preclusion trap problem. When the Court found
that Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement prevented the San Remo
plaintiff from pursuing a subsequent federal claim on the grounds of issue
preclusion and plaintiff asked for an exception to be made, the Court held
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not permit exceptions in such a
situation. Since prudential ripeness allowed exceptions and constitutional
ripeness did not, the Court inadvertently asserted that the requirement was
a constitutional commanded ripeness prong.248
Consideration of each of these facts indicates Williamson County’s
exhaustion requirement is more properly interpreted to fall under the
classification of constitutional command ripeness rather than prudential
ripeness. As such, the correct analysis for the Court to determine whether
exhaustion of state procedures was actually required would have been based
on only the Fifth Amendment, the Takings Clause, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
More specifically, the Patsy Court for instance, referenced a two-part test
that looked first at the statutory language and then at congressional intent
and legislative history underlying the statute. Application of that test to the
facts of the instant case would have led to the conclusion that Williamson
248. Then, the Court in Chicago created a conflict when it indicated on one
hand that the requirement was jurisdictional despite the cases before it that stated the
exhaustion requirement was non-jurisdictional, but on the other hand that it was allowed
to waive the requirements. Holding the requirement as jurisdictional would mean the
requirement was constitutional command ripeness yet allowing waiver would mean
exceptions were allowed and that it was prudential ripeness.
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County’s exhaustion requirement was not permitted and was
unconstitutional because it deprived property owners of their constitutional
right to bring a federal claim and to pursue their constitutionally granted
right to just compensation for a taking. From this conclusion, the Court
then should have answered the stare decisis question in part two. In light
of the constitutional rights jeopardized here, the Court should have found
the potential deprivation of constitutional rights outweighed any entitlement
to stare decisis that Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement might
have had, whether “enhanced” or not. Therefore, it was proper to overrule
the Williamson County exhaustion requirement.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court imposed a rule in Williamson County that
required property owners with Fifth Amendment takings claims to first
exhaust state procedures for compensation unsuccessfully, before they were
permitted to file a claim for compensation in federal court. The question of
whether to overrule Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement was
frequently avoided until the Supreme Court decision in Knick v. Township
of Scott. Ultimately, the Knick majority opinion properly concluded that
Williamson County’s requirement prevented full exercise of the
constitutional right to compensation granted to property owners by the Fifth
Amendment and had resulted in a grave error that necessitated prompt
correction.
However, the Court’s opinion not only failed to apply the proper
test and instead applied an informal method of factors, but it also
improperly used a combination of constitutional and prudential ripeness
principles when it should have only applied constitutional ripeness
principles. Williamson County’s exhaustion requirement was formed
without authority, against legal precedent, and resulted in unconstitutional
effects. Upholding Williamson County would have been unjust and the only
guaranteed option to promptly correct those problems within the Supreme
Court’s authority was to overrule Williamson County’s exhaustion
requirement entirely.
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